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FIRM SIZE EFFECTS ON VENTURE CAPITAL SYNDICATION: THE ROLE 
OF RESOURCES AND TRANSACTION COSTS 
 
 
Abstract 
The present paper examines firm size effects on the decision of venture capital firms to 
participate in a venture capital investment syndication network. The authors submit that 
firm size effects in venture capital syndication are dependent on resource acquisition 
motives and transaction cost considerations. Analysis of 317 venture capital firms in 6 
European countries reveals a curve linear relationship between firm size and venture 
capital syndication participation. We also find positive and negative moderating effects 
of firm size. The implication of our findings is that there are both advantages and 
disadvantages in syndicated investment for the smaller and larger venture capitalist. 
 
Keywords: venture capital, firm size, syndication networks, resource-based view, 
transaction cost theory 
 
JEL classification: G2, G3, D8 
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1. Executive summary 
Syndication involves two or more venture capital firms taking an equity stake in an 
investment, either in the same round or, at different points in time. The extant literature 
emphasizes venture capital syndication as a means to gain access to resources from 
syndicate members. Such resources may allow venture capital firms to reduce the 
volatility of their returns, improve their management capabilities or gain access to deal 
flow generated by the syndicate. However, venture capital firms may be less motivated 
to syndicate transactions if they believe that sole investing by themselves generates 
superior returns as compared to participation in a syndicated investment. Management 
of syndicated investments may be less flexible and takes more time than non-syndicated 
investments, as well as introducing greater chances of conflicts. This paper investigates 
the impact of venture capital firm size on its decision to participate in a syndicate. 
Grounded in resource based and transaction cost economics theory, it examines how 
VC firm size is related to resource acquisition and transaction costs and thus influences 
the decision to participate in the syndicate. 
We conjecture five main explanations why venture capital firm size is related to 
syndication participation. Firstly, we expect that larger venture capital firms are better 
able to diversify their investments, have more management expertise available and more 
access to deal flow due to their central network positions. Thus, larger venture capital 
firms have more of these resources available and therefore have a lower need to 
syndicate their investments. Secondly, transaction costs of the syndicate governance are 
likely to increase complexity with the number of partners in the syndicate. Smaller 
venture capital firms have smaller amounts available for investment and a smaller 
portfolio scale and scope. Ex post transaction costs may rise substantially with a more 
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diverse and larger number of syndicate members involved. Thirdly, smaller venture 
capital firms are more likely to change their investment focus in the syndicate if their 
relatively smaller funds are fully invested which may increase the costs of renegotiating 
in terms of complexity and timeliness. Fourthly, small firms have a narrower range of 
transactions, related to a smaller volume of sales, which reduces the risk for the 
perpetrator of opportunism. Finally, smaller venture capitalists go bankrupt more easily, 
thereby increasing the risk of discontinuity towards the syndicate partners. 
The data were gathered using a mail survey in 6 European countries, ranging 
from Northern Europe (United Kingdom, Sweden) to central countries as France, 
Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium.  Our sample thus includes countries in 
different parts of Europe, where the venture capital industry is since long established 
and industry practices have matured. 
Our findings indicate that the decision to participate in syndication networks 
increases as the venture capital firm size increases. However, this relationship is non-
linear. Beyond the number of approximately 8 to 9 investment executives per VC firm 
the syndication participation decreases. Our results show that small firms have a 
transaction costs disadvantage in syndication participation and are less likely to 
participate in syndication networks even though they would like to do that. However, in 
early stage deals smaller venture capitalists can use their relative advantage in 
flexibility and niche-filling capacity in early stage investment. This result supports the 
proposition of resource-based and transaction cost theory that smaller and larger firms 
have different strategic positions in resources and transaction costs. In syndication 
networks venture capital firms may combine these relative strengths. For example, 
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smaller venture capital firms may deliver promising seeds and start-ups where larger 
venture capital firms subsequently invest large sums of money into. 
 
2. Introduction 
Syndication involves two or more venture capital firms taking an equity stake in an 
investment, either in the same round or, at different points in time (Brander et al. 2002). 
The extant literature emphasizes venture capital syndication as a means to gain access 
to resources from syndicate members. Such resources may allow venture capital firms 
to reduce the volatility of their returns, improve their management capabilities or gain 
access to deal flow generated by the syndicate (e.g. Bygrave 1987; Manigart et al. 
2002). However, venture capital firms may be less motivated to syndicate transactions if 
they believe that sole investing by themselves generates superior returns as compared to 
participation in a syndicated investment (CMBOR, 2002). Management of syndicated 
investments may be less flexible and takes more time than non-syndicated investments, 
and may bring about greater chances of conflicts (Wright and Locket, 2003). 
In organizational studies firm size is considered one of the most influential 
variables (Chen and Hambrick, 1995). Large size has been seen as giving a firm such 
advantages as economies of scale, experience, brand name recognition, and market 
power (Hambrick et al. 1982). Conversely, smallness has been credited with increasing 
flexibility in production, in price, in enhancing speed and risk-seeking behavior (Chen 
and Hambrick 1995). Hofer (1975) identified size as a critical variable moderating the 
relationship between strategy and performance. Other studies (Smith, Guthrie and Chen, 
1989) supported this idea empirically. Size is also proposed as an explanation of the 
level of transaction costs (Nooteboom, 1993; Verwaal and Donkers 2002). A smaller 
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portfolio scale and scope reduces risk for the perpetrator of opportunism (Nooteboom 
1993, p. 291) and increases the number of partners in the syndicate, which makes 
renegotiating more difficult and time-consuming (Wright and Locket, 2003). In this 
paper we explore firm size related advantages and disadvantages in transaction costs 
that may explain different levels of syndication participation. 
In order to explain venture capital firm size effects in syndication participation 
we use two theoretical perspectives: the resource-based view and transaction cost 
economics. These theoretical approaches are considered complementary by their main 
contributors (e.g. Penrose, 1996; Williamson, 1999). Penrose defines the distinguishing 
nature of the firm in line with Coase (1937) as an ‘administrative hierarchy’ and ‘court 
of last resort’ (Penrose, 1959, p. 16) and considered resource value and transaction cost 
issues not as mutually exclusive. Her view is shared by Williamson (1999, p. 1098) who 
states that the transaction costs and the resource-based view ‘deal with partly 
overlapping phenomena, often in complementary ways’. Moreover, a growing body of 
literature suggests that transaction costs not only complements the resource-based view 
but also influences resource value creation. (Mahoney, 2001; Jacobides and Winter, 
2005; Foss and Foss, 2005). 
The aim of the present paper is to advance the theoretical perspective on venture 
capital syndication by demonstrating that there are important firm size effects which 
depend on both resource acquisition motives and transaction costs considerations. First, 
we conceive the syndicate as a governance form that allows venture capital firms to 
gain access to resources and we argue that larger firms have more resources available 
and thus have a lower need to syndicate their investment from a resource-based 
perspective. Then, we present a transaction costs framework of participation in 
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syndicated investments and we explore the consequences of firm size effects on 
syndicated venture capital investment. We submit that there are both positive and 
negative effects of size in transaction costs of a venture capital syndication network. 
Subsequently, we describe the data and present the empirical results. Finally, we 
conclude with a discussion of the results, the limitations of this study, and provide 
directions for future research. 
 
3. Firm size and resource acquisition motives for venture capital syndication 
participation 
 
This section reviews the resource motives to participate in venture capital syndication 
and their relationship with firm size. Based on the literature three types of resources 
may be distinguished: financial diversification, access to management expertise and 
exchange of deal flow. 
Financial diversification. The financial diversification motive stems from 
financial theory (Cumming, 2002; Zacharakis 2002). Syndication facilitates 
diversification of the venture capital firm’s investment portfolio into industries that can 
compensate a drop in one market with a rise in another, because the investments in 
different industries differ in the way they are influenced by macro-economic factors 
(Zacharakis 2002). Lockett and Wright (2001) showed that the dominant motive for 
venture capital firms in the UK to syndicate their deals is spreading financial risk 
through risk sharing. De Clerq and Dimov (2004) found support for a financial risk 
sharing rationale for syndication among 200 US-based venture capital firms over a 12-
year period. From the perspective of financial diversification, larger venture capital 
  
 
7
firms have fewer incentives to participate in syndication networks (Manigart et al, 
2002) since they can more easily diversify within their own portfolio. 
Access to management expertise. The management expertise of a venture 
capital firm is likely to be constrained by the scope of its activities. The need to gain 
access to specific management expertise through syndication may particularly be 
important if venture capital firms try to access to a geographical region, industry or 
investment stage outside their normal range of investment activities. Syndication 
networks may provide access to the superior expertise of other venture capital firms, 
thereby improving the quality of selection and the management and monitoring of 
investments (Sapienza et al., 1996; Wright & Locket, 2002). Several studies support this 
access to management expertise argument (Sorenson and Stuart, 2002). Larger venture 
capital firms have a broader scope of activities and therefore are less likely to need 
expertise outside their knowledge and capabilities base and therefore have a smaller 
incentive to syndicate their investments (Barnet and Amburgey, 1990). 
Access to deal flow. Venture capital firms are not likely to identify interesting 
opportunities outside their natural investment area (Sorenson & Stuart, 2002). 
Syndication allows venture capital firms to do so by using interfirm networks across 
geographic and industry boundaries (Manigart et al., 1994; Sorensen & Stuart, 2002) 
and venture capital firms that are part of syndication networks may increase the 
likelihood of being invited into future deals. From a deal flow perspective, larger 
venture capital firms are more likely to hold central network positions and therefore 
have more access to deal flow (Seppä and Jääskeläinen, 2002) and thus lesser need for 
syndication. 
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 In sum, from a financial diversification, management expertise as well as an 
access to deal flow perspective, we may expect that larger venture capital firms are 
better able to diversify their investments, have more management expertise available 
and more access to deal flow due to their central network positions. Larger venture 
capital firms have more of these resources available and therefore have a lower need to 
syndicate their investments. In the following section we explore the role of transaction 
costs in the relationship between venture capital firm size and syndication network 
participation. 
 
4. Firm size and transaction costs of venture capital syndication participation 
According to transaction cost economics, the fundamental problem of organizations is 
how to cope efficiently with an unpredictable environment and governance structures 
are predominantly instruments of adaptation to uncertainty (Williamson, 1999). 
Uncertainty results primarily from strategic behavior (opportunism) and non-strategic 
behavior (bounded rationality) of transaction partners. Firms will prefer those 
governance forms that by approximation show the highest level of comparative adaptive 
efficiency to unexpected future contingencies. 
Venture capital syndication as governance structure is particularly likely to 
differ in its adaptive capability compared to sole investing. Unanticipated events may 
need to be discussed and renegotiated by the syndicate partners and therefore response 
may be less swift (Wright and Locket, 2003, p. 2083). Furthermore, the bargaining 
process following unexpected contingencies in syndicated investments may also lead to 
conflicts of interest resulting from either ex post opportunism or bounded rationality of 
the syndicate partners. Hence, the response by venture capital firms that sole investing 
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is more flexible and generates superior returns as compared to a participation in a 
syndicated investment (CMBOR, 2002) can very well be explained by the transaction 
costs of syndication governance. The transaction costs of the syndicate governance form 
are likely to increase if the complexity and thereby the relational risks of the 
governance structure increases. 
Why would firm size change the complexity and relational risks of the 
syndicate? Let us consider for example the case of the smaller venture capital firm. 
Firstly, transaction costs of the syndicate governance are likely to increase complexity 
with the number of partners in the syndicate (Wright and Locket, 2003). Smaller 
venture capital firms have smaller amounts available for investment and a smaller 
portfolio scale and scope. Ex post transaction costs may rise substantially with a more 
diverse and larger number of syndicate members involved. Secondly, smaller venture 
capital firms are more likely to change their investment focus in the syndicate if their 
relatively smaller funds are fully invested which may increase the costs of renegotiating 
in terms of complexity and timeliness (Wright and Locket, 2003). Thirdly, small firms 
have a narrower range of transactions, related to a smaller volume of sales, which 
reduces the risk for the perpetrator of opportunism (Nooteboom 1993). Finally, smaller 
venture capitalists go bankrupt more easily, thereby increasing the risk of discontinuity 
towards the syndicate partners (Nooteboom 1993). Thus, the transaction costs of small 
venture capital firms are likely to be higher compared to large venture capital firms as 
they increase the complexity and relational risks of the governance structure. 
 In sum, we argue that smaller venture capital firms face higher transaction costs 
of syndicated investment and therefore are less likely to syndicate, however, from a 
resource-based view, larger firms have lower incentives to syndicate their investments. 
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After some point the relative magnitude of the venture capital firm size effect of 
transaction costs on the decision to syndicate will be smaller than the impact of the 
venture capital firm size effect of resource motivations. Therefore, based on the 
combined transaction costs and resource-based analysis, we propose a curve linear 
relationship (inverse U-shaped curve) between venture capital firm size and syndication 
network participation. 
 
H1: venture capital firm size is first positively related and then negatively related to 
participation in syndication networks (inverse U-shaped relationship). 
 
Thus, larger venture capital firms have less to gain from syndication; however, they also 
create lower transaction costs in a syndication network. A syndicate that consists of a 
few large venture capital firms will be more manageable and adaptive to changing 
conditions than a syndicate including a large number of smaller venture capital firms. 
Although the potential for value creation by resources may be increased, firms may not 
be able to fully realize the benefits of the resource attributes provided by the 
syndication network. Put differently, the capability to create value from the resources 
provided by the syndicate might be constrained by the transaction costs of the 
syndication network (Foss and Foss, 2005). Therefore, we expect that given their 
resource motivations, larger firms are more likely to actually participate in syndication 
networks than smaller venture capital firms. As a consequence, we expect that the 
impact of syndication motives on syndication participation will increase as firm size 
increases. Hence we formulate that: 
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H2a: There will be a stronger impact of financial risk diversification motives on 
syndication network participation when venture capital firm size is large. 
H2b: There will be a stronger impact of resource-based motives on syndication network 
participation when venture capital firm size is large. 
H2c: There will be a stronger impact of deal flow motives on syndication network 
participation when venture capital firm size is large. 
 
Previous studies suggest that venture capital firms investing in early stage investments 
emphasize uniqueness and growth potential of products rather than demonstrated 
market acceptance as in later stage investments (Elango et al., 1995). High levels of 
asset-specific investments are particularly associated with early stage investments (seed 
and start-ups) where technology, management and markets are generally new. The early 
stage investors, compared to later stage investors, are specialized in the sector and 
invest more intuitively on the basis of incomplete information. This contrasts with later 
stage investments that focus more on historical information on profitability, cash flow 
forecasts and the use of complex debt arrangements. The level of uncertainty is likely to 
be higher in early stage deals, which underlines the necessity to develop capabilities to 
handle unexpected specific requirement. Smaller venture capital firms are seen as being 
quicker and more nimble due to their structural simplicity (Chen and Hambrick, 1995. 
Small firms, can coordinate their smaller number of employees by direct supervision in 
stead of formalized co-ordination of the specialized work processes (Mintzberg, 1979), 
which facilitates their advantage of speed and flexibility in organizational processes. 
Therefore, small venture capitalists may be more efficient in responding to 
unanticipated specific requirements in early stage investment and therefore have 
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relatively lower transaction costs (Nooteboom, 2002). Large venture capital firms may 
even use smaller venture capital firms as pipelines to deliver those promising seeds and 
start-ups to invest in (see Hibbard, 2004). Thus: 
 
H3: There will be a stronger impact of early stage investment on syndication 
participation when venture capital firm size is small. 
 
In the next sections we present our data and empirically test our theoretical framework. 
 
5. Method 
The data were gathered using a pre-tested mail survey. The questionnaire was 
developed with the assistance of venture capital firm managers, advisors and academics 
(see Locket and Wright, 2001). We administered the questionnaire in 6 European 
countries, ranging from Northern Europe (United Kingdom, Sweden) to central 
countries as France, Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium.  Our sample thus includes 
countries in different parts of Europe, where the venture capital industry is since long 
established and industry practices have matured. 
The questionnaires were translated into French and Dutch in order to be used in 
France and Belgium. The questionnaire was administered by post to the head offices of 
all 106 venture capital firms in the United Kingdom, identified using the British 
Venture Capital Association handbook and CMBOR (Centre for Management Buy-out 
Research) records. In Belgium data was collected by sending a questionnaire to 79 
venture capital firms, identified using an own constructed database and the membership 
list of the Belgian Venturing Association and the European Venture Capital 
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Association. In France, data was collected by sending out 120 questionnaires to the full 
members of the ‘Association Française des Investisseurs en Capital Risque’.  In Sweden 
three different sources were used to select 169 venture capital firms: the membership 
list of the Swedish Venture Capital Association, the membership list of the Swedish 
National Board of Technical and Industrial Development and an own constructed 
database. In Germany and the Netherlands the untranslated questionnaire was sent to 
the 191 members of the EVCA and 50 members of the Dutch Venture Capitalist 
Association.  In all countries, a follow-up was done either by sending reminders or by 
calling the venture capital firms after 1 – 2 months. 
The total sample consists of 317 usable responses (44% response rate) from 6 
European countries (63 United Kingdom, 66 Sweden, 49 France, 68 Germany, 29 The 
Netherlands and 42 Belgium). These countries are considered matured in the venture 
capital firm industry (Manigart et al, 2002). As response rates and participation in 
syndication networks might be related, non-response bias of the sample was tested 
using the test of Armstrong and Overton (1977), and no significant deviation was found. 
In addition, the representativeness of the sample was tested for each country separately 
using firm specific characteristics (minimum investment preference, maximum 
investment preference and the number of staff members) available from the national and 
European venture capital directories. In Belgium, France, Germany and the 
Netherlands, no significant differences were found between respondent and non-
respondents. In Sweden and the United Kingdom, the respondents’ maximum 
investment preference is significantly (5% confidence level) larger than that of non-
respondents. This indicates that the sample is generally representative for the venture 
capital firm industry in the six countries of the study. 
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 To examine the empirical relationship between venture capital firm size and 
syndication participation intensity, we measure syndication participation in five 
categories of proportions of investment syndicated. At a 5-point categorical scale we 
measure whether 0-20%, 21-40%, 41-60%, 61-80 or 81-100% of the deals are 
syndicated of their total deals. 
Various measures can be used to express firm size, such as the number of 
executives, the number of venture capital firm investments syndicated or the size of 
investments. We have chosen the number of venture capital firm executives as our size 
measure. The size of the labor force is one of the more common methods of measuring 
organizational size (e.g. Tosi and Patt 1967; Blau and Falbe, 1976). Alternative 
measures of firm size such as for example sales volume are highly correlated with 
number of employees (Smith, Guthrie and Chen, 1989).  More importantly, the number 
of employees is closely linked to the theoretical basis of the firm size argument: 
economies of specialization and speed and flexibility in organizational processes. 
Venture capital firm size in terms of the number of specialized venture capital 
employees captures both the economies of specialization and the complexity of 
coordination of the venture capital firm. Therefore, for this study the number of venture 
capital firm executives is the most appropriate measure of firm size. 
A description of the variables is presented in Table I and an overview of the 
bivariate correlations is presented in Table II. The scale items relating to syndication 
motivation were first factor analyzed, using principle component procedures and 
varimax rotation. By means of an exploratory factor analysis, we analyzed the different 
dimensions of the scales to assess their unidimensionality and factor structure. Items 
that did not satisfy the following criteria were deleted: (1) items should have 
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communality higher than 0.3; (2) dominant loadings should be greater than 0.5; (3) 
cross-loadings should be lower than 0.3; and (4) the scree plot criterion should be 
satisfied (Briggs and Cheek, 1986; DeVellis, 1991). This resulted in a pool of 11 
questions, which are listed in Table I. Next, the reliabilities of the dimensions of each 
scale were assessed by means of the Cronbach alpha coefficient. The alphas are 0.81 
(Management expertise), 0.72 (Financial diversification) and 0.83 (Access deal flow). 
Furthermore, all items have correlations of 0.70 or more with their respective 
constructs, which suggests a satisfactory item reliability (Hulland, 1999). 
*** Place Table I about here *** 
We used confirmatory factor analysis with EQS version 6.1 and maximum likelihood 
estimation to validate the scales resulting from the exploratory factor analysis. A 
satisfactory fit was achieved (χ2 = 112, df = 41, p < .01), root-mean-square estimated 
residual [RMSEA] = 0.06, Bentler-Bonnett Normed fit index [NFI] = 0.92). The ratio of 
chi-square to degrees of freedom is 2.73; a value of less than 3.0 for the ratio indicates a 
good fit (Carmines and McIver, 1981). A NFI value above 0.9 is considered an 
indication of good fit, and the RMSEA of 0.06 indicates good model fit because it does 
not exceed the critical value of 0.08 (Bentler and Bonet, 1981). Thus, the measurement 
model is acceptable, given these supportive indices. 
Discriminant validity of the scales was further verified by comparing the shared 
variance between any two constructs and the variance extracted from each of the 
constructs. In all cases, the shared variance between two constructs was less than the 
variance extracted from each of the constructs, supporting the validity of the 
measurement model (Fornell and Larcker, 1981), and none of the confidence intervals 
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of the correlation coefficients between any two constructs contained 1.0 (Anderson and 
Gerbing, 1988). 
 Control variables for country differences and the source of funds are included.  
 
6. Results 
Given the nature of the dependent variable, we use an ordinal regression model. The 
bivariate correlations of the variables under study are presented in Table II. The 
correlations between venture capital firm size and the other variables suggest that 
venture capital firm size is larger in the UK and venture capital firm size is smaller in 
the market of early stage investment and managed funds.  In addition, in line with the 
theory (Manigart et al, 2002) the financial diversification motive is more important for 
smaller firms. 
*** Place Table II about here *** 
The results of the ordinal regression are presented in Table III. In line with the findings 
of previous studies (Lockett and Wright, 2001; Manigart et al., 2002), we find a positive 
coefficient (p < .05) between the financial risk diversification motive to syndicate and 
participation in syndication networks. We find a smaller coefficient for access to 
resources (p < .10) and the results in Table II indicate that deal flow motives have no 
significant role in the decision to syndicate venture capital investments. This evidence 
supports the finding of Lockett and Wright (2001) and de Clerq and Dimov (2004) that 
the spreading of financial risk is the dominant motive effect to syndicate venture capital 
firm investment. The effect of deal flow remains insignificant in alternative models 
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where the non-linear effect of venture capital firm size and moderating effects are 
included in the model (see Model II en III in Table II). 
*** Place Table III about here *** 
Model I in Table III shows that the effect of venture capital firm size is small and 
insignificant. This would indicate that venture capital firm size is not important or 
alternatively suggests misspecification of the functional form. In Model II, we include 
the quadratic term of venture capital firm size to allow the estimation of a nonlinear 
model of the effect of venture capital firm size. The results of model II in Table III 
show that venture capital firm size is positively related to participation in syndication 
networks and highly significant (p < .01). A highly significant (p < .01) and negative 
quadratic venture capital firm size term demonstrates that the effect of venture capital 
firm size decreases as venture capital firm size increases. Both the significance of this 
quadratic term and the improved fit of the model imply that the relationship is curve 
linear (inverse U-shaped) as suggested by hypothesis 1. Figure 1 plots the relationship 
between venture capital firm size and syndication network participation. The plot shows 
that up to about a venture capital firm size of 9 investment executives the relationship is 
positive (75% of the 317 observations) and that for venture capital firms with more than 
8 executives the relationship is negative. Thus, for a large majority of venture capital 
firms in Europe minimizing transaction costs dominate the relationship between venture 
capital firm size and syndication participation. For venture capital firms larger than 9 
investment executives (25%) the resource motivations dominate the venture capital firm 
size effects in syndication network participation. 
*** Place Figure I  about here *** 
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Hypotheses 2a, 2b and 2c are concerned with the moderating effect of venture capital 
firm size on motives to participate in syndication networks. The estimation results of 
Model III, IV and V in Table III show that the moderating effect of venture capital firm 
size on access to resources and financial risk diversification motives is significant (p < 
.05), supporting hypotheses 2a and 2b.  Hence, when venture capital firm size is large 
there will be a stronger impact of financial risk diversification motives and of access to 
resources motives on syndication participation. Hypothesis 2c states that the deal flow 
motive is moderated by venture capital firm size, which is not supported by the 
evidence. However, as reported above the main effect of deal flow is also not 
significant, indicating that deal flow is not an important motive in the decision to 
participate in syndicate networks for both smaller and larger venture capital firms. 
 Models VI and VII from Table III show that stage of investment is highly significant 
and positively associated with a venture capital firm's syndication participation (p < 
.01). This result indicates that the necessity of the venture capital firm to syndicate early 
stage investments is very powerful. Looking at the negative interaction effect of venture 
capital firm size and stage on the venture capital firm's syndication participation, the 
results from model VI and VII in Table III also support hypothesis 3 that early stage 
investment is more positively related to venture capital firm syndication participation 
when venture capital firm size is small. 
 In model 7 from Table III we estimate all hypothesized effects simultaneously 
and the results support the findings from the individual estimates (Table III model 2-6). 
This implies that the results in this study are robust, even if all effects are taken 
simultaneously into account. 
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Finally, in relation to the control variables, the country characteristic variables 
show that only the United Kingdom and France significantly deviate from the European 
average, where France is positively and the United Kingdom is negatively related to 
participation in syndication networks. 
 
7. Discussion and conclusion 
 
The results of this paper contribute a number of key findings to the study of venture 
capital firm syndication. First the results show that small and large venture capital firms 
differ significantly in their participation in syndication networks and that venture capital 
firm size moderates the resource motive-syndication participation relation. We also 
demonstrated that small venture capital firms have a transaction costs advantage in early 
stage deals, and that they can use their relative advantage in flexibility and niche-filling 
capacity in early stage investment, while larger venture capital firms can use their 
advantage of scale in later stage investment. This result supports the proposition of 
transaction cost theory (e.g. Nooteboom, 1993; Verwaal and Donkers, 2002) that small 
and large firms face different levels of transaction costs. More generally, our evidence 
leads us to conclude that venture capital firm size influences the strategy of syndication, 
which in turn influences how its resources interact with the transaction and how the 
venture capital firm chooses to govern it. 
A number of areas for further research are suggested by our results. For 
example, researchers should take into account the role of transactions costs more 
explicitly by measuring the relative cost advantage of the syndicates and the link with 
the capabilities of the venture capital firm’s management. It would be interesting to 
examine the driving factors behind the transaction costs of the syndication network and 
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when and how they exceed the transaction costs of sole investing. As indicated in our 
study, increase in transaction cost by long lead times for coordinated action in the 
syndicate (Wright and Lockett, 2003) may offer an explanation why venture capital 
firms prefer the option of sole investing. 
In our research the composition of the syndication networks are unknown as 
well as the change in it. There is a need to look at the dynamics of the composition of 
syndication networks over time in terms of venture capital firm size, governance and 
control, skills/experience, investment stage and cross border types. Longitudinal 
research could shed more light on how syndicates with different compositions share 
resources and risks and how successful they are. 
Our study supports the work of Lerner (1994) that venture capital firms prefer 
syndicating with larger and established colleagues, however, in contrast to Lerner we 
find that this behavior may not be sensible for early stage deals. Further research could 
reveal other factors that influence the level of transaction costs. Early stage expertise, 
mostly found in smaller venture capital firms, can become critical for larger syndicate 
partners to control transaction costs by providing timely support in product innovation 
and new business formation. Especially in cases where investees face rapidly changing 
technology and knowledge environments with short product life cycles that make rapid 
dissemination of information necessary. Large venture capital firms that do not possess 
the kind of specific social and technical assets to handle these kinds of uncertainties in a 
flexible way with their portfolio companies would welcome those who can. In the 
United States, for example traditional LBO associations have been joining forces with 
venture capital firms for this reason. Overall, this type of research could yield insight 
into the effectiveness of the venture capital firm governance and control under different 
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economic situations and in general into the contribution of the venture capital industry 
for the economy. 
Like all research, this study has several limitations. First, our study includes 
venture capital markets with different levels of development. Other follow-up 
multinational studies may focus on institutional differences between the countries as 
size of funds of the venture capital firm or on specific elements, such as the valuation 
approaches of venture capital firms in the syndication process. Also, our dependent 
variable is measured on a five point scale while a continuous measurement may yield 
more precise estimates. The results may also be time frame specific and influenced by 
the “tech bubble” for the West European countries in 2001 and 2002. 
In conclusion, our study contributes to the literature of transaction cost and 
venture capital finance by providing a novel approach to examining transaction cost 
factors linked to venture capital firm size that affect syndication among venture 
capitalists. Overall, we found that transaction cost arguments explain the extent to 
which small and large venture capital firms engage in syndication. We hope that our 
study leads to a deeper investigation of the process through which the venture capital 
industry may enhance successful governance. 
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FIGURE I 
The relationship between venture capital firm size and syndication network 
participation 
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TABLE I 
 
Description of the variables 
 
Name 
 
Median 
 
Mean 
 
S.E. 
 
Description 
 
 
 
LogSize 1.61 1.64 .95 The log of the number of venture capital firm executives 
Management 
expertise 
(α = 0.81) 
2.40 2.57 1.13 Composite measure with the following items 
- The deal is outside the industries in which you usually 
invest 
- The deal is located outside the geographical region(s) 
in which you usually invest 
- Difficulty in bringing in industry experts from outside 
- The deal is outside the investment stage(s) in which 
you usually invest  
- The need to access specific skills in order to manage 
the investment 
Financial 
diversification 
(α = 0.72 ) 
4.00 3.79 .89 Composite measure with the following items 
- The large size of the deal in proportion to the size of 
funds available 
- The requirement of additional rounds of financing 
- The large size of the deal in proportion to the firm’s 
average deal size 
- The large size of the deal in proportion to the largest 
deal previously undertaken 
Access to deal 
flow 
(α = 0.83) 
3.00 2.73 1.12 Composite measure with the following items 
- The possibility of the future reciprocation of deals 
- The reciprocation of past deal flow 
Stage 1.00 .60 .49 Dummy variable where early stage investment is 1 and later 
stage investment is 0 
Sweden 0.00 .16 .36 Dummy variable where Sweden is 1 and else is 0 
Belgium 0.00 .12 .33 Dummy variable where Belgium is 1 and else is 0 
France 0.00 .19 .39 Dummy variable where France is 1 and else is 0 
Netherlands 0.00 .12 .32 Dummy variable where The Netherlands is 1 and else is 0 
UK 0.00 .25 .44 Dummy variable where the United Kingdom is 1 and else is 
0 
Own sources 0.00 .46 .50 Dummy variable where own sources is 1 and else is 0 
Managed funds 0.00 .37 .48 Dummy variable where managed sources is 1 and else is 0 
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Table II 
 
Pearson Correlations 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11
) 
(12
) 
Sweden (1) 1    
Belgium (2) -,16 1   
UK (3) -,25 -,22 1   
France (4) -,20 -,18 -,28 1   
Netherlands 
(5) 
-,16 -,13 -,21 -,17 1   
Managed 
funds(6) 
,21 -,06 -,16 -,04 -,06 1   
Own funds (7) -,13 -,05 ,18 ,05 -,01 -,70 1   
Resources (8) ,05 ,21 -,12 -,06 -,04 ,13 -,09 1   
Diversification 
(9) 
,05 ,04 -,00 ,04 -,02 ,03 ,03 ,08 1  
Deal flow (10) -,09 -,01 ,01 ,10 -,06 -,07 ,05 ,19 ,15 1 
Stage (11) ,21 ,09 -,19 -,06 -,11 ,07 -,04 ,10 ,03 -,07 1
Size (12) -,18 -,13 ,17 -,07 ,03 -,23 ,10 -,06 -,21 ,10 -,19 1
Bold = p<.05 
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TABLE III 
 
Estimation Results Syndication Network Participation 
 
Explanatory 
variables 
Model 
 I 
Model 
II 
Model 
III 
 
Model 
 IV 
 
Model 
V 
Model 
VI 
Model 
VII 
(Cut-off parameter 1) 1.42** 2.43*** 2.51***  2.23***  2.50***  2.62*** 2.49*** 
(Cut-off  parameter 2) 2.55*** 3.59*** 3.68***  3.40***  3.66***  3.80*** 3.70*** 
(Cut-off parameter 3) 3.45*** 4.53*** 4.62***  4.35***  4.59***  4.74*** 4.65*** 
(Cut-off parameter 4) 4.61*** 5.72*** 5.82***  5.55***  5.79***  5.94*** 5.85*** 
Sweden   .08   .11 .12    .04    .11    .06   .17 
Belgium   .56   .67 .69    .62    .70    .70   .69 
United Kingdom -1.04***  -.96*** -.96*** -1.04***   -.97*** -1.05*** -1.10*** 
France    .62   .72* .71*     .61*    .73*    .72*   .63* 
The Netherlands    .13   .39 .35     .41    .38    .30  .29 
Managed funds    .61*   .77** .81**     .91**    .82**    .75**  .92** 
Own funds    .51*   .46 .47*     .55*    .49*    .43  .52* 
Resources    .13*   .14* .12*    .14*    .15*    .13*  .12* 
Diversification    .28**   .28** .28**    .27**    .27**    .29**  .28** 
Deal flow    .12   .07 .08    .06    .07    .08  .08 
Stage    .71***   .82*** .81***    .80***    .81***  1.23*** 1.13*** 
LogSize    .11 1.39*** 1.53***  1.21***  1.46***  1.35*** 1.31*** 
LogSize2   -.32*** -.35***  -.26**  -.33***   -.25**  -.24** 
LogSize*Resources   .22**      .19** 
LogSize*Diversificatio      .40**     .35** 
LogSize*Dealflow       .14    .05 
LogSize*Stage        -.05** -.04* 
 
Model summary 
*    = P<.10 
**   = P<.05 
*** = P<.01 
Pseudo 
R-square 
.190 
Pseudo 
R-Square 
.230 
 
∆χ2= 
11.6 
Pseudo 
R-Square 
.240 
 
∆χ2= 
3.2 
 
Pseudo 
R-Square 
.243 
 
∆χ2=  
4.1 
Pseudo 
R-Square 
.233 
 
∆χ2=  
1.1 
 
Pseudo 
R-Square 
.242 
 
∆χ2=  
3.6 
 
Pseudo 
R-Square 
.273 
 
∆χ2= 
10.1 
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